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Philosophical assumptions about identity, being and belonging have, as is well 
know, historically been bound together; their classical nexus being Plato’s 
Socrates, who because of this figures as the first philosopher of the city.  
Especially during moments of crisis, the impulse, both philosophically and 
politically, even today, is to make abject those who appear not to conform to the 
appropriate ideal identity of what ought to be.  In the first part of our1 paper we 
consider the philosophical logic of this pedagogy of the city and its cultural 
context and implications; and in the second part, we demonstrate this pedagogy 
of the city as a practice, using ethnographic data derived from a study of a 
homeless couple and their struggle to become a family amidst the homeless 
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How the city teaches us, aesthetically  
 
This is not a pretty paper, nor could it be, given that it is about an awkward and 
uncomfortable property of being; which is, namely, its metaphysical fabrication.  
Our paper and the specific slice of being with which it is concerned is even uglier; 
as we view the fabrication of being from the perspective of its margins, and 
therefore from the perspective of those who, according to the workings of the 
established order, barely have the right to be included, and by their very nature 
are without the right to properly belong. 
 
It may also appear to be somewhat frivolous to align any serious discussion 
about our education concerning the rights of those who live on the margins, who 
barely belong and struggle to hold any legitimate identity within the security of 
the established order, as being anything to do with any kind of theme of 
aesthetics; with how things should or ought to appear to be.  But that is broadly 
what we are going to do; asserting more or less that, the reason why, particularly 
at moments of crisis, the impulse of the established order is to abject rather than 
include those aspects of itself that undermine any metaphysical guarantee of its 
own establishment and legitimacy, is because of an aesthetic or ideal form, that 
registers how things should or ought to appear to be.  Indeed, if pushed, we 
would be inclined to argue that the reason of the established order, its symbolic 
reasoning, which motivates its general actions, is largely organized around this 
same aesthetic principal.  The classical locus for this arrangement is, of course, 
Plato’s Socrates.   
                                                        
1 The research for this paper was carried out jointly by myself and XXX; who, despite my best 
entreaties, has declined to be credited as its joint author; but nevertheless, should this paper ever 
be favourably regarded, must receive enormous credit for her crucial contribution to the 




As is well known, texts from Plato that clearly demonstrate this same impulse to 
abject those aspects of the state that expose the fabricated nature of an 
ontological right to be, include the Republic; within which Socrates famously 
argues that imitative poetry and certain passages in literary and dramatic works, 
as well as artists who do not support the ideal constitution of the city, should be 
exiled, since they are false additions to and corruptions of that which is 
metaphysically meant to be: 
 
If a man who is capable by his cunning of assuming every kind of shape 
and imitating all things should arrive in our city, bringing with himself the 
poems he wished to exhibit, we should fall down and worship him as a 
holy and wondrous and delightful creature, but we should say to him that 
there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a 
man to arise among us, and we should send him away to another city, 
after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with fillets of 
wood (Plato, Shorey, 1953) 
 
To briefly reprise what has been expertly detailed many times: Socrates’ 
problem is not with the enormous linguistic facility, nor with expertise garnered 
in any other medium, by any potential Athenian citizen, but with what use any 
such facility is put to, and only then if that usage and representation is not in a 
true accord with the ideals of the civic reality around which Athens functions and 
is sustained.  This form of accounting and registering – of accounting for life and 
registering its propriety, which is to say its right to be, in order for life to have its 
identity maintained and thereby demarcated within the established order of the 
city, expressed alongside its vicious compulsion to abject those aspects of being 
that it regards as not seeming to belong – is primarily an aesthetically motivated 
pedagogy.  It is interesting that historically art has popularly come to be 
regarded as a contemplative and abstract meditation and representation of 
something – perhaps a face, a cart abandoned in a river, a woman reading a letter 
– or some condition or other – such as, a look of love, or abandonment, or the 
night – as removed from the economy of being (the social economy, the financial 
economy, the cultural economy, where its worth is actively debated, negotiated, 
contested, experienced, and so on); so that it might be contemplated in its own 
space, such as in a gallery, or some part of a landscape.  In particular, art tends 
now to be removed from those aspects of the economy that involve its violence.  
To clarify and reduce the provocative nature of this argument, we need to 
separate out from this discussion any idea of depicting violence; so, for example, 
when we talk about violence we are not specifically interested in whether or not 
a painting or installation takes as its subject matter a fight, or any similar or 
different form of dispute.  Instead the violence we refer to here, is intrinsic to all 
forms of art and representation; it is automatic and unavoidable, and is 
engendered by the wrenching apart of experience from any kind of mimetic 
intent in relation to that experience.  The violence we are interested in, is the 
violence inherent in the expression of all mimetic intent; that this (a word, or 
picture, or gesture, or thought, or reflection) represents, and therefore in some 
way, despite not being that, nevertheless is that, or is some aspect of that as it is 
revealed to you.  It is both the assertion that this represents that, but more 
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acutely is the ripping away of this from that, which is ineluctably necessary in 
any formulation of this in relation to that, which constitutes the violence 
inherent in all aesthetics of being.  All such forms of aesthetic judgement, that 
this is attempting to be an approximation of that, that this departs from that, in 
relation to being and being (appropriately) in place, are necessary in order to 
identify that which does not belong, elements that often will be marked by signs 
that are thus taken for their difference, and in relation to how things ought to be, 
for their ugliness, so that they can become abject.   
 
 
Establishing security through abjection  
 
William Blake Tyler (2012), drawing on the work of Girard has noted how the 
fate of Socrates, this first pedagogue of the city, mimics the fate of the pharmakoi 
at the festival of Thargelia; when representatives of the ugly and the poor, who 
were without the rights accorded to those for being a citizen, and who were 
therefore without the right to belong, as if being within the state was determined 
not politically but by a metaphysical right of being, were first of all fed 
ostentatiously at public expense, that is at the expense of Athenian citizens, but 
were then physically abused, in effect scourged, and then led outside the 
boundaries of the city where they were likely to be killed.  The pharmakoi, those 
without the right to be, who bear all the signs of being outside any system of 
ideals, and possessing no accord with the metaphysical state of Platonic forms, 
by their poverty, poor diet, lack of education, chronic exposure to physical and 
emotional hardship, are also signs of the limitations of any such metaphysical 
assumption of an order, of an essentially aesthetic nature, of a right to be.   
 
They are the public manifestation, albeit ordinarily confined to the margins of 
public knowledge and regard, that despite the laws, cultural practices, and 
modes of thought that support the assumption of Athenian metaphysical being, 
this is no guarantee against what Lacan refers to as the Real; which in this 
context is represented by the presence of the poor, which seeps from the 
margins into civil consciousness, that Athenian society is unable to 
accommodate.  And it is in order to symbolically and literally rid itself of this 
material and psychic impurity, which undermines the fundamental credibility for 
the metaphysical order, of the right to be, that the presence of the parasitic 
pharmakoi are brought to public attention by their ostentatious feeding at public 
expense, followed by their ritual removal from within the being of the city, so 
that they can become abject, disposed of; and thus the city becomes cleansed.  In 
much the same way, Athens’ reaction to Socrates’ pathological compulsion, of 
publicly demonstrating the epistemological and political vacuity upon which the 
foundations of Athenian’s beliefs, practices and institutions are based, especially 
during moments of crisis – which, at the time of Socrates’ death, is framed by the 
parlous state of the city following its disastrous involvement and defeat in the 
Peloponnesian Wars –  is analogous to the fate that Plato’s Socrates bestows 
upon those artists, works, practices and others with which he disagrees: they are 
commonly made abject.  And it is in Socrates’ condition of finally being made 
abject by Athens, at his trial and execution, that we are able to see that this is an 




If we remember, we said that an aesthetic judgment was one predicated by the 
principle that something, this, ought to effectively reference that, where 
‘effectively reference’ is always a political decision about managing a relative 
conformity, in order to seem to be like that.  It is also possible to more easily 
observe in this example, the violence inherent in all aesthetic judgements, when 
this does not conform to that mimetic rule, and Socrates is made abject from life, 
by being poisoned with hemlock as pharmakos by the state, by which means the 
state is then made clean.  As Derrida was very fond of noting (for example, 
Derrida, 1981) that is always impossible to pin down; principally on account of 
that, in itself, never being there, or anywhere, in the first place, since that is also 
always only ever a reference, though a reference privileged by the assumption 
that it is not so, but is instead the thing, whatever that might be, itself.  The 
common activity that inhabits every aesthetic process is the violence separating, 
as we have been saying, this from that; and this representation, whatever form 
it might take, being contingent upon factors beyond its own bearing.   
 
But we should also note another way, the secondary, complementary part of the 
process that we have just prefaced, that violence inheres to all aesthetic 
judgments; which is namely through the violence by which all identity is forged, 
as if it were not so composed, as if it were integral to itself.   
 
Lacan’s famous perspective, from which he observes how a child obtains an 
identity that is meaningful to itself and the seemingly distinct world of others by 
being registered and sutured to the Symbolic Order (Lacan, 1966) is decisive in 
this context.  The child, or any subject, accedes to the Symbolic Order –the 
apparently external world of meaning through which their own identity and 
understanding is mediated – by misrecognizing an image of itself as who they are 
in their reflection in a mirror.  The image in the mirror is, of course, a convenient 
shorthand for the way that who and what you mean is not determined by some 
innate precondition of yourself, but is reflected back to you, by the infinite array 
of other reflections that you receive.  Reflections manifested, for example, by 
carer and non-carer utterances, the behaviours of others, and the intransigent 
and more yielding encounters that you might have experienced through the 
physical world around you.  Crucially, none of these reflections are you.  They are 
not your expressions.  You cannot control them.  They do not originate from 
within, as some authorial testimony to the truth of your unique soul.  Though 
that is what your soul is; that is how your soul is forged.  Because outside this 
alloy of your being, there is nothing else, only your emptiness.  This is the 
Lacanian lack, the desperate, unbearable emptiness at your centre through 
which you are constituted (Lacan, 1977).  They are the reflections of others, 
collectively of the big Other, the Symbolic Order, which position you, locate you, 
express your place, and thus compose your identity, so that you can seem to be.  
 
It is the activity of being perceived to be, of regarding, which is the aesthetic 
practice that determines if, and how, and whether sufficiently this represents 
that.  And it is the violent activity of being regarded by the Other, of this being 
regarded as that, where otherwise this would be unrecognisable, which shapes 
the contours of your identity, the nature of your meaning, the level of your 
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worth, and the caste of your being.  And of therefore whether you have the right 
to be, as a thing or practice or human subject; of whether you have the right to 
any life, residing within some space.  Indeed, broadly speaking, this is the very 
condition that residency, ontologically, depends upon. 
 
 
Forging identity  
 
If we return once again to the allegations made against Socrates, of denying the 
city’s gods, of adding new gods to the civic pantheon, and corrupting the youth of 
the city by means of his teaching, it has persuasively more than once been noted 
that Socrates is guilty, perhaps most famously in The Birth of Tragedy, and in 
Twilight of the Idols.  If we conclude in one sense at least, that Socrates’ 
pathological engagement was with Athens’ political forgery of metaphysical 
truth, as supported by the political function of the city’s gods, then there is a 
clear analogy with the first of the charges brought against him (Giordano-
Zecharya, 2005).  All we need do is substitute Athenian gods for civic virtues and 
practices, as modes of existence that relate to the immediacy of civic political 
being, then witness Socrates’ relentless and sometimes vicious undermining of 
their credibility.  In contradistinction to this contingent, imperfect and thus, from 
a metaphysical point of view, essentially flawed practice (Taylor, 2007), the 
philosophical knowledge that Socrates advocated was derived, according to 
Socrates, from the voice of God, rather than being fabricated through the 
mediations of the city environment.  This is not the religious perspective of the 
Athenian polis.  This represents a fundamental difference between on the one 
hand, the politics of being a citizen, resulting in the assumption of the ontological 
status of being a citizen, along with any of its accompanying rights and 
obligations, as a matter of civic regard; and on the other hand, the ontological 
status and rights that would seem to be the assumption of a private interiority, by 
the assumption of being able to carefully regard one’s self.  Socrates’ God does 
not announce His intensions and presence, and therefore His allegiance, or so it 
could be argued on political grounds, to Athens in general; but only to a single 
member of its polis, namely Socrates; where otherwise divine order normally 
translates as state intention and presence, as evoked, for example, in public and 
domestic rituals and festivals.  But no, this God whispers in Socrates’ psychic ear 
alone, so that apart from through Socrates, no one else can hear or know this 
philosophy of the divine.  And similarly, surely the very point of teaching such 
things, is to publicly expose their contingent and inferior political nature when 
identified as their relation to a metaphysical virtue that, given the ideal and 
therefore enduring nature of its perfection, can only be mimetically approached 
in life.  And, it is when civic virtue and politics in general is identified as being in 
relation to metaphysical virtue that their nature appears to be intrinsically 
corrupt.  By contrast, civic virtue and politics, as being in relation to itself, that is 
to say, as contingent behaviours in relation to the immediacy of circumstance, 
cannot be corrupt.  From this perspective, you do not have to look very far to see 
why Socrates has been associated with death, whilst the work of his best known 
critic, Nietzsche, has been characterised as an iconoclastic affirmation of life (see, 
for example, Reginster (2006) as but one commentary amongst almost the 
general consensus of all).  Socrates’ incessant teaching requires Athenian’s to put 
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aside the immediacy of their engagement with the affairs of the city, and its 
politically organized forms of being, as well as those aspects of the self that 
promote the politics of the ego; especially so if this identity of the self is stitched 
into cultural and other forms of aggrandizement.   
 
But before we are allowed the much more comfortable judgment, that Socrates 
was primarily concerned with the moral order of Athenian society and the 
transparent probity of its operations, which is, of course, true, any such 
comfortable judgement elides its origins and the motivation behind Socrates’ 
incessant critical attention.  These origins and motivation are found in the 
conviction that life, specifically the civic life of Athens, is inferior to the eternal, 
divinely ordered existence, of which Socrates’ has been uniquely afforded 
glimpses and insights; glimpses and insights that form the divine inspiration of 
his pedagogy, the pedagogy of the city.  So let us, for a moment, suspend the 
over-determination of moral right that is always the given, a priori condition, 
from which Socrates’ position proceeds, as if it were his (and perhaps it is this 
combination of personal moral conviction, derived from the interiority of one’s 
self, from one’s soul, as Socrates describes it, that is his enduring originality).   
From this perspective, it is much more obvious that Socrates’ is at best 
unconcerned with the immediacy of the present moment; he suspends or even 
derides the contingent relations that such immediacy and unpredictably 
engender; that is to say, he reduces life, except in preparation for its end and 
death.  As F.C. White amongst many others has noted, Socrates “… believes with 
as much certainty as is possible that he will be with gods who are in every way 
good masters… and he confidently believes that there is a life to come, a life to 
come moreover…  [that is] much better for the good than for the wicked” (White, 
2006: 447).  Indeed, so great is Socrates’ personal conviction that, “… all who 
engage worthily in philosophy will follow him [Socrates] in death as soon as 
possible” (White, 2006: 447).  This is a conviction that for the worthy, death 
brings a condition that is better than being alive; where the worthy are those 
who lead a life as determined by Socrates’ philosophy, which Socrates denies as 
being his, claiming that such philosophy is simply channelled through him, as 
God’s representative.   
 
What lies, in both senses of this word, at the empty heart of this conviction, 
empty because it seems barren to the disordered contingency and imperfection 
of lived communal experience, is the determination of purity and power.  White 
(2006) is hardly alone in making this point, especially in relation to the Phaedo 
and the other texts that deal explicitly with Socrates’s trial and last days.  For 
example, Warnek (2005) carefully identifies Socrates’ preoccupation with being 
itself, and its continuity with thought itself, and with truth itself; a consequence of 
which is the identification of sensual, corporeal, emotional and political being as 
pollutants, corruptions and distractions from the transcendence of ontology 
itself; such that Socratic philosophy marks a radical caesura in the development 
of Western thought.  A caesura according to which the body and its situated 
being is then intellectually and pragmatically abandoned.  And of this 




Within the relatively narrow confines of classical Greek philosophy and society, 
what we have witnessed is not the pure and simple domination of the 
established order, whether constructed as a metaphysical guarantee of 
epistemological and spiritual truth framed as the Platonic ideal, or as the 
determination by the legislative mechanisms of the Athenian polis of what the 
proper conduct and teaching of its citizenry ought, and ought not, to be; both 
instances of which, we have argued, are aesthetic judgements, determined by 
their respective forms of regard; and both of which lead to the abjection of each 
by the other.  Whilst we have argued that it is the power of the assumption of the 
established order that inevitably, in any form of contest, and particularly 
viciously so during moments of crisis, renders that which does not mimetically 
conform, abject, whether the example is the discordant practices of everyday life, 
the pharmakoi, or the body; they are, we believe, all characterised within this 
schema by their contingent existence as opposed to metaphysical assumption.  
But since the metaphysical guarantee of the right to be and the right to belong is 
no real guarantee at all, being instead an exercise in the power to determine, 
such a guarantee is dependent upon the extent, which is also to say, the limit, of 
its force.  Within the field of what has become human experience, the power to 
determine can be crushing, but never complete.  It may be contested by 
conscious and unconscious circumstance, by its own fabricated nature, by 
limitations in its investment, by lethargy and enthusiasm alike, by the 
unaccountable nature of contingent existence.  And so what we observe, in the 
social ontology of our daily lives, and particularly at its margins, and during 
moments of crisis, is a persistent vacillation, an unending movement from 
identities and practices that are held in place by a metaphysical assumption, 
which is always on the side of the established order, allied to Lacan’s Symbolic 
Order; but through their encounter with contingent experience, their innate 
fragility, their exposure as being forged, incomplete, redolent with the limitation 
of being, uncovered and subject to the bleak finality of what Nietzsche 
understood as life.  And, again, there are obvious similarities here with Girard’s 
(1987) analysis of scapegoating.  Of course, the over-riding impulse of the 
established order, its reason, is to cover over any cracks that appear, to abject 
the contingent which does not belong, to seal up ruptures in fabricated being, to 
close its borders, police the perimeter by which it is defined.  But this 
pathological condition of the established order is never able to rid itself of the 
vacillation between an identity’s metaphysical assumption and its exposure to 
the fabrication of its contingent being.         
 
 
An ethnography of the city’s pedagogy   
 
The onto-cultural practices we have so far briefly reviewed in relation to the 
abjection of those aspects of the established order it deems do not belong, are of 
course essentially redemptive in their motivation and orientation.  The figure of 
Jesus Christ and the establishment of the Roman Catholic Church are other 
famous examples that comfortably sit within this same nexus of crisis, abjection 
and redemption.  But this essentially conservative impetus, characterized by a 
tendency to reassert the enduring, transcendent, metaphysical assumptions that 
structure the cultural practices and predispositions of an established order is not 
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the only – though it may be the predominant and most powerful – response 
available.  As Sal Flavel has recently pointed out:  
 
‘Nietzsche’s “death of God” refers to a moment of profound upheaval 
within European culture. The death of God represents not only the demise 
of the Christian deity, but also the destruction of all absolute conceptions 
of reality, truth, and the good: those metaphysical values that have 
sustained philosophy in the West since Plato.’ (Flavel, 2015: 12) 
  
But whereas Flavel interprets any Nietzschean demonstration of the absolute 
hollowness of metaphysics as an opportunity ‘… to open itself up to dialogue 
with traditions of thought that had previously been characterized only in terms 
of their irreducible difference’ (Flavel, 2015: 13); instead, what we have been 
inclined to predominantly observe is the more consistent impetus for the abject 
bodies of any established order to at the most, contest their right to have some 
kind of presence in the public space of the Agora, in whatever form that might 
take, before being marginalised in ways against which they appeared to have 
little if any control.  We could illustrate this contemporary tendency of the 
Nietzschean pedagogy of the state to abject those bodies that do not belong, 
through the current refugee crisis, and would argue that at the moment, we are 
witnessing, in the West, if at all possible, a second ‘death of God’; so that we seem 
to have killed God twice, which is quite an achievement in relation to the 
immortal being of all time, represented by not only the economic and political 
destabilization of Europe, or at least very specific parts of Europe, but also by the 
massive disruption in parts of Africa and the Middle East.  But instead, we would 
like to trace this same movement at a much more local level, by drawing on 
recent ethnographic research we have undertaken with a group of chronically 
homeless people in Chester.  In particular, we want to focus on a homeless 
couple, Joe and Sal, who had hoped to become a family.  At the time we were 
conducting research, Sal was seven months pregnant.  Before, however, we 
proceed any further, we would like to add a caveat: 
The assumption of metaphysical being, that things are as they are because they 
are necessarily so, with that form of being expressing a model of lived 
experience, such as might find its analogue in the model of the traditional 
nuclear family, or the role of the mother, or father, or the virtues and behaviour 
of an Athenian citizen or contemporary British or any other national identity, 
however loosely interpreted is not a matter of choice or idiosyncratic 
construction.  They are the assumptions by which identity is forged; and 
however impermanent, fragile or idiosyncratic any such identity might be, there 
is no alternative by which any onto-epistemic identity might come to be.  From 
the perspective of the established order, however, a perspective that bleeds into 
the identities of those who do not belong, the being of those who exist on the 
margins appears to be much more contingent in nature, and especially so when 
their bodies are made abject.  What we propose to do for the remainder of the 
paper is to trace with you a single morning that we accompanied Joe and Sal 
from the Day Centre into the city, drawing attention in particular to the way that 
identities shuttle unceasingly between the assumptions of metaphysical and 




When we arrived outside the Day Centre at around ten in the morning, Joe was 
very animated and loud, and was standing with a few friends away from the 
main group of homeless people, including Sal.  Sal explained that Joe was a bit 
agitated (and very pleased with himself): he had just been released from the 
local custody suite, having been detained over-night following a police raid at 
about ten-thirty during the previous evening on the temporary accommodation 
where they were being housed by a local charity.  That temporary housing was 
provided by a local charity, and not the Local Authority, which acts as the local 
representative of the state, is highly significant in this context, and is continuous 
with the politics of mimetic desire drawing on Girard’s work, especially when 
applied to the state, as we have described in relation to Socrates’ teaching and 
Athens.  Sal was assured by the Local Authority that if she applied for housing on 
her own, as a single mother-to-be, then she would be housed as a priority.  Not 
only were Sal and her unborn child at risk, because she was homeless; their 
vulnerability, and hence the urgent need to find them appropriate housing, was 
increased because of Sal’s mental health issues and her history of addiction and 
substance abuse.  Sal did not, however, want to be identified through the regard 
of the Local Authority, which functions in this context as an aspect of the 
Symbolic Order, as a single mother.  She and Joe wanted to be a couple, to be 
regarded as an expectant family, and to belong within this normalised symbolic 
matrix, and thereby accrue all of the rights and investments that members of the 
community of the family would normally expect to quite naturally follow.  Joe’s 
own criminal record, and history of addiction and substance abuse precluded the 
Local Authority from regarding Joe and Sal as a couple, much less an expectant 
family; and so in this guise, of family-to-be, they were unrecognized by the state, 
and were quite literally refused accommodation.  Onto-politically, they were 
made abject, since mimetically they did not legitimately belong, according to the 
reason of the established order.  It is therefore very significant that it was a local 
charity that was able to provide Sal and Joe with temporary accommodation, 
since by definition they operate outside the auspices of the state, specifically 
ministering to the needs of those that the state fails to regard, according to the 
aesthetic and mimetic principles that we have described.  And it is especially 
significant in terms of traditional Roman Catholic theo-logical reasoning, which, 
in its designation of the Holy Family, the Family that will come to represent the 
ontological guarantee of all lived ontic family experience, inverts the figure of the 
family made abject, the family that does not belong, has no place to be, by 
providing shelter outside what would otherwise be recognized as legitimate 
habitation.  Again, what we are clearly able to observe in the structure of this 
symbolic arrangement, is the vacillation between identities that conform to an 
aesthetic principle guaranteed by the authority of the established order, and 
contingent experience that lacks the necessary investment within the same order 
for any such place to be maintained; and that this is a dynamic rather than 
fixedly determined process, is demonstrated in the way that the Church, and in 
this case the work of a charity, recuperates the abject family, transforming it into 
a symbol of salvation.    
 
At a more micro individual behavioural level, it is by understanding this 
philosophical dynamic and the logic of abjection, that we are able to appreciate 
the degree of feeling that animated Joe that morning, and why he was in such an 
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intensely oppositional and ebullient mood.  The size of the police operation that 
had been mounted on the house, during which, late at night, the police had 
sealed off both ends of the road where the house was sited, and had entered the 
property with dogs, signalled an overwhelming display of force by the 
established order to abject those who did not belong.  This was both a physical 
and symbolic attempt to police the border separating those with the right to be 
from those whose identity, for whatever reason, did not conform to the 
legitimate mimetic order of being.  And yet, despite the size of the operation and 
the extensive nature of the search, nothing had been found, and Joe had been 
released without charge.  The onto-local-logical position, if we think of the ‘local’ 
component of this clumsy neologism as designating the symbolic and 
geographical place of the right to be, at this point was doubled and contradictory.  
On the one hand, Joe was regarded by the established order as existing at best 
along its margins, with intense attempts by its representatives, in the guise of the 
Local Authority and the police, to expel him from its proper domain of being.  It 
was against this regard that Joe vigorously protested his right to be, as the 
expectant father and head of a family-to-be, thus vociferously declaring his belief 
in having an identity that legitimately belonged within the established order.  On 
the other hand, the fact that the police had failed to find anything during their 
search, and had been forced to release Joe intensified his own – quite momentary 
– triumph over the established order, and its attempts to render him abject, 
which also confirmed his – momentary – identity as being victoriously 
oppositional to the same order about which he was also claiming the right to 
belong.  Again, this is typical of the movement of being, of the oscillation between 
symbolic and contingent identity.    
 
 
Soon after, we and the rest of the group moved along the short and well-known 
route from the Day Centre into the heart of the city, to an area known as the 
Cross.  The Cross is historically and contemporaneously a very significant public 
space, and functions, because of this, in a way similar to that of the Athenian 
agora.  Allen (2002) explains how the classical Athenian agora, the principle 
public space within the city, functioned as the locus of the requirement of being 
present in order to register the onto-juridical right of one’s identity as having the 
right to be for any Athenian citizen during this period.  So that, for example, 
minor transgressions of Athenian law might result in a citizen not being allowed 
into the agora for a limited period of time; so that during this time, they were 
quite literally absent, taking no part in the social economy of being.  Not being, 
that is to say, not being a citizen, and therefore not being regarded as such by 
those who belong, carried with it rights that literally determined the capacity to 
be, i.e. to live, for one’s self.  We can see this in the escalation of punishments that 
were appropriate for citizens guilty of more severe transgressions of the law; 
with greater crimes being punished with a citizen not only being barred from 
entering the Agora, but also the name of the person not being allowed to be 
mentioned, in order that even this form of their representation was removed 
during this period; to ever more severe cases where former citizens might be 
permanently exiled, or executed, with their names being struck from public 
records, their houses and property being raised and expunged from existence, 
11 
 
and any monuments, bearing reference to their being, destroyed, their presence 
materially obliterated from circulation in the economy of public memory. 
 
Originally deriving its significance as the cross roads of the city, the Cross grew 
to be a civically designated meeting place and place of religious worship, and 
thus over time grew in importance, as signified by the historical monument 
erected there, also known as the Cross, as well as it developing into being the 
commercial heart of the city.  With Chester now deriving most of its income from 
tourism, the cultural and therefore commercial value of the Cross as a civic space 
has intensified.  It is one of the key areas in the city where tourists and organized 
tours gather.  The businesses around the Cross, including shops and restaurants, 
are financially dependent upon this space and how it is occupied.  The Cross is 
also one of the most significant spaces within the city for its community of 
homeless people.  Part of its significance for homeless people is much like the 
agora in classical Athens: it is a place through which the social economy of one’s 
being is registered and made present; it is a place to be, to be seen and 
recognized, in public, in common.  And there are other features of this area that 
in practical ways confirm its significance specifically for homeless people.  For 
example, behind the Cross, Saint Peter’s Church has a drop in area, which 
provides physical shelter from the outside as well as minimally priced drinks and 
food; there are benches outside, at the Cross, which are extremely important if 
you have no place of your own to sit and rest; the Cross is surrounded by a series 
of covered alleys, above street level, called the rows, which are relatively quiet 
and provide shelter from bad weather.  For all of these reasons, the Cross has 
also become an area where homeless people meet, socialise, and move off from, 
for various reasons, including to score drugs, and generally socialise.  It is also, 
given the different kinds of investments that we have just described in the area 
that are specific to the different populations that we have sketched, not 
unnaturally very much a contested space; with its contestation registered 
electronically through the high levels of CCTV in and around the Cross, linked 
directly to the police.  On the particular morning in early summer that we have 
been recalling, there were large numbers of Japanese sight seers on an organised 
tour gathered in the area.   
 
It was also a particularly hot day.  We sat on the benches with Sal, Eddie and a 
number of others, whilst Joe’s ebullient and oppositional mood intensified.  
Given the context, this was not unpredictable, especially when a community 
support police officer appeared.  Joe proclaimed loudly to the community 
support police officer, that whilst he was about to be a father, indicating Sal on 
the bench, he had to endure a police raid on his house, was taken away, kept 
over-night, then released without charge; by comparison the Japanese tourists, 
who were not even from this country, were being allowed to gather in large 
numbers at the Cross, and were not even being questioned by the police, let 
alone seemed likely to be told to move on.  Joe’s response to the context is 
entirely continuous with the process of oscillation between what we have 
described as symbolic being, which is always allied to the established order, and 
the experience of contingent being, which exists between the cracks in the 
identities that forge the assumption of a metaphysical reality.  It was again his 
appeal to the traditional role of the father, by which he sought the right to 
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independently identify himself with the legitimacy of the established order, and 
the refusal of the order to accept this as part of his legitimate identity and 
therefore his right to belong, which both motivated and enraged Joe; especially 
in relation to the Japanese tourists; and especially in the location of the Cross, the 
contested public space, that appeared always available to those who were, in 
Joe’s eyes, overtly foreign and therefore, according to his logic of outrage, should 
not be granted the right to belong.  It was also significant that the official 
representing the established order was a community support police officer, and 
not a police officer.  Community support police officers are immediately 
identifiable as such, and are viewed very much by the homeless community as 
‘pretend’ or ‘fake’ or ‘baby’ police officers; their status is often demeaned 
because their identity is regarded as forged, as not being real.  Indeed, Joe also 
pointed this out to the community support police officer who was present at the 
Cross.  In many respects, this was a point about the construction and 
undermining of assumed metaphysical identity in relation to the city, which is 
not dissimilar to Socrates’ teaching about the epistemic and ontological pretence 
of Athenian civic life.      
 
As Joe’s encounter with the community police officer intensified, Eddie noted 
that he was in danger of being arrested; again, there are also parallels in this 
respect with Socrates; and in order to avoid Joe’s removal by the police, Eddie 
made the following intervention.  He left the benches where we were sitting and, 
approaching Joe and the community support police officer, explained that Sal 
was struggling in the increasing heat of the day, and since there was no shade at 
the Cross, suggested it would be better if we all moved off to the nearby precincts 
of the Cathedral, which was a much more pleasant and sheltered environment 
from the sun, and probably for Sal, was an altogether healthier place to be, as the 
heat mounted.  Eddie’s tactical exploitation of symbolic identity and the 
behaviours that accompany it, in this case the act of sacrificing and rising above 
self-interest in order to take care of one’s partner and unborn child, thereby 
disengaging from the bind of contingent experience that appeared to be 
heralding Joe’s immanent arrest, is also inextricably bound to the physical and 
social contours of the city, through which the economy of identities come to be 
forged.   
 
Once within the relative shade of the benches behind the Cathedral, the group, 
including, Joe and Sal, began to role and smoke joints; nevertheless, even though 
this is an activity that we might assume falls outside notions of expectant 
parenting that are consistent with the established order, it was not regarded as 
such by those present.  Indeed, what immediately followed prompted Sal to 
assert the importance of a commitment to respecting parental roles and the need 
for others to display behaviours that supported rather than undermined good 
parenting.  This was motivated by the appearance of Sam.  As Sam approached, 
Eddie commented that he was probably looking for his coat, having forgotten 
that Eddie had earlier agreed to look after it for him.  This caused Sal to say that 
even though Sam provided amusement for the group, by means of his 
disorganization and forgetfulness, this behaviour was in fact not funny but 
actually irresponsible.  She went on to explain that only recently, they too had 
volunteered to help Sam by storing some of his things at the house where they 
13 
 
were staying, one item of which included his coat.  Unfortunately, as was typical 
of Sam, he had forgotten to remove the drugs and drug paraphernalia, including, 
she claimed a needle, syringe and heroin that he had some time earlier been to 
score.  This would have been bad enough, but what made it worse was that Joe 
was an ex-heroin user: staying clean is always very hard, but much more so at 
times of stress, and this was an extremely stressful period with Joe about to be a 
father.  There is no doubt that what Sal said was true.   
 
We had met Sam the previous day, without any of the others, when he had 
stopped to speak to us on the benches at the Cross.  He told us that he had just 
tried to kill himself, by hanging, but that his huddie, which he had used in the 
attempt, had ripped.  Sure enough, the garment was damaged.  He then asked to 
borrow thirty-six pence, which would give him enough money to buy a sausage 
roll from the pound Bakery, before intending to move off to end his life at the 
viaduct.  We were glad the following day to see him alive.  Unfortunately Sam 
has, for some time now, disappeared from view.  Rumours abound about what 
has happened to him in relation to a drug debt.  We would like to dedicate this 
paper to the hope that they are not true.            
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